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Executive summary 
 
The Intersectional Philippines MSF Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Response review was requested by 
the Executive Committee of MSF. It was designed to examine the operational choices of each 
Operational Centre, the perceived cost disparity, the role of the MSF regional offices in the 
emergency and the external perception regarding MSF’s added value in the response. The review 
took place during August and November 2014. 
Overall the response by MSF to Typhoon Haiyan was well perceived by all involved – with good 
geographical coverage, including a focus on the more rural and isolated communities, pertinent 
activities and services, a timely response compared to other actors, excellent coordination and 
information sharing with the authorities and other actors and good communication relating to the 
different exit strategies.  
The response was timely compared to other actors, but the first MSF consultations were only done 
six days after the emergency and MSF’s surgical services commenced only after two weeks. MSF 
missed the opportunity to send small regional teams prior to the emergency which could 
potentially have saved a day or two but this is not definite. The focus on rural and isolated 
communities, such as the islands, was an important strategy with high impact. In pure time terms 
relating to the treatment of the injured following a natural disaster, it can be said that MSF was late 
in some locations. 
The very low surgical activities done by OCB and OCBA raised the question of pertinence of the 
decision to send and setup an OT, especially as they were not functioning until two weeks after the 
typhoon. This indicates that MSF’s medical role in such a natural disaster (in a country where MSF is 
not present) will not be the immediate care of the wounded, but is more orientated towards the 
re-establishing of health care services that have been interrupted because of the disaster.  
The presence of five OCs allowed for a good geographical coverage which was appreciated by the 
authorities and it allowed for a good contextual understanding and provision of a wide range of 
assistance. The fact that all OCs were present was not seen as a negative but many of those 
interviewed in hindsight thought three sections would have been sufficient.  
There was a cost disparity regarding the different operational choices and strategies which resulted 
in a wide difference between budgets. This disparity between the sections can be explained, based 
firstly on their different policies towards natural disaster responses and by the location of each OC 
which was a major factor in subsequent operational choices and the strategies of each OC. Because 
of their policy commitments, OCP and OCB were the first to decide to send teams and intervened in 
the areas with the biggest needs. In addition, it must be remembered that both OCP and OCB 
continued to provide services in 2014, whereas OCA, OCBA and OCG all took the decision to wind 
down their activities in December and exit in January 2014.  
The MSF response was perceived as having had an added value and played an important role in the 
overall response, especially regarding the input provided by MSF as part of the foreign medical 
teams. In addition, the strategy of MSF-OCB was particularly highlighted as an example by the 
authorities and UN agencies, especially WHO and UNOCHA which addressed the short and mid-
term needs required by the communities and authorities.  
The main obstacle remains the difficulty of access in natural disasters. From an MSF perspective 
the issue of supply remains a constraint, even though this doesn’t seem to be the case for OCB. 
How many resources are allocated towards managing supply in an emergency is still an issue for 
some OCs. Initially insufficient resources were provided to manage the supply chain in Cebu and 
solutions to share roles and responsibilities between OC teams were ad hoc and not pre-defined. 
There is no agreed strategy or structure in place prior to an emergency on how to collaborate and 
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share responsibilities and resources and prevent competition between supply teams during an 
emergency.  
The role of the regional offices, especially Hong Kong, was very useful regarding the provision of 
human resources; particularly experienced by Philippine staff. However, there were missed 
opportunities to send teams prior to the typhoon making landfall. However, whether this would 
have made an impact is debatable, but the opportunity was there.  
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Abbreviations 
 
ANC  antenatal clinic 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Typhoon Haiyan, known locally as Typhoon Yolanda, hit the central Philippines region of Eastern 
Visayas on 8 November 2013. It was classified as a category 5 tropical storm and is unofficially the 
strongest recorded storm to make landfall. At its peak, the winds were recorded up to 280 km/h1. 
The eye of the storm made landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar province of Leyte province. As the 
storm weakened, it made five additional landfalls in the Philippines2.  
 
The typhoon was followed by a storm surge of between 4 and 6 metres with Leyte and Samar 
islands being the worst affected. In Tacloban, Leyte province, the airport terminal building was 
destroyed by a 5.2 metres wave. The resulting damage from the Typhoon affected an estimated 
11.5 million people with 63003 being reported killed and 544 606 displaced4. The number of deaths 
was low considering the intensity of the typhoon, which was in a large part due to the 1215 
evacuation centres and the pre-warnings provided.  
                                                          
1
 China Meteorological Administration 
2
 UNOCHA map 
3
 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) 
4
 BBC News Website 14-11-14 
Emergency response to Typhoon Haiyan, intersectional review, Nov 2014 
5 
All five MSF Operational Centres (OCs) intervened in the subsequent emergency with four OCs 
supporting projects in Eastern Visayas (Tacloban city, Guiuan, Ormoc, Burauen and surrounding 
areas) and one OC in Western Visayas (Carles and Estancia). Within the different MSF responses 
there was a significant difference of both scale of activities and subsequent cost of the 
interventions.  
The MSF Executive Committee (ExCom) requested an operational critical review of the MSF 
Typhoon Haiyan emergency from an operational and a fundraising perspective (not part of this 
review). This critical review will analyse the operational strategies used by each OC as well as the 
role of the MSF regional capacity (Hong Kong, Japan and Australia) and their added value in the 
response. 
 
1.2 Scope 
The operational critical review’s main focus is on the first weeks of the emergency but it also 
provides an overview of the six-month period from November 2013 to April 20145.   
This review is not fully exhaustive but aims to provide the main elements in terms of timeliness, 
relevance, (regional) support, differences around operational choices and lessons learnt from the 
response.6  
 
1.3 Methodology 
Both a qualitative and quantitative methodology were used during the review. To define the 
process, main questions and persons relevant for each issue to interview, an evaluation design 
matrix was created. Following this data collection included: 
 Interviews of key actors in the response (all e-desks and identified team members, Operational 
Directors, regional offices) 
 Review of key documents e.g. correspondence, action plans, project committees, sitreps, 
assessments, reports 
 Global review of medical and operational data: no in-depth analysis of outcomes 
 Interview of key external national and international actors during a twelve-day field visit 
 Review of previous research including aid system analysis  
 
1.4 Limitations 
The main limitation was linked to the availability of key persons. This was due to the heavy volume 
of work experienced during the time of the evaluation because of MSF’s involvement in other 
emergencies such as Ebola. It must be noted here that this impact was reduced by the willingness 
of people to make themselves available even if it was not convenient. 
The second limitation was the amount of documents and data available, which were poorly 
organised in most cases. 
                                                          
5
 See 5.1 Terms of reference 
6
 See 5.1 Terms of reference  
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2 Findings 
 
While this is an operational critical review, the findings do not only focus on what can potentially be 
discussed, learnt from or improved in terms of the different operational responses but also 
highlight the positive aspects of the emergency response. The review does not evaluate in detail 
the operational outcomes but looks at them from a global perspective in the context of the 
situation at the time.  
 
2.1 Anticipation and preparedness 
2.1.1 Natural disaster policy 
All the MSF Operational Centres (OCs) have a policy or strategy towards responding to natural 
disasters though not all are formalised in a document or have been updated recently. These 
policies have fluctuated over the years and are dependent on the context: regional or international 
at the time of the natural disaster. There are some questions regarding the validity or benefit of 
responding to natural disasters, especially in countries where MSF is not present already, e.g. the 
MSF-OCA policy states that there is 
“… Little added value to intervene in natural disasters in countries where MSF (OCA) is not 
present. This is questioned when the scale of the emergency exceeds expectations (CNN 
emergencies) and in those cases, OCA will evaluate a response”. 
For MSF-OCB as well as for MSF-OCP, natural disasters are a reason for intervention, especially for 
large scale natural disasters (like Typhoon Haiyan) when it is clear that normal coping mechanisms 
of the countries will be overwhelmed. OCB over other OC’s has developed a clear strategy when 
responding to natural disasters which involves switching from an initial emergency medical focus to 
relief (in this case shelter focused) and then to recovery which can include a mid-term medical 
structure solution. While for OCP there is a clear focus on the added value of a medical response by 
MSF which needs to be emphasised.   
Another important point to emphasise regarding the OCB approach is the need to quickly 
incorporate the second phase "recovery" into the action plan. In case of Typhoon Haiyan, a mid-
term exit solution was also included. The OCBA approach has evolved over time. Whereas emphasis 
has been put on prepositioning of stocks some years ago, especially in South America, two years 
ago it was realised that this approach has been neither efficient nor cost-effective, and was 
therefore changed. OCBA as well as OCG consider that a response to natural disasters remains part 
of their operational portfolio.  
 
2.1.2 Contacts and knowledge 
MSF has had operations in the Philippines in the past, the most recent being the OCP response to a 
number of small scale emergencies following natural disasters between 2011 and 2013. However, 
only a few networks or contacts were still available from these interventions, except for those 
established by the Emergency Response Support Unit, Hong Kong (ERSU) and the deputy e-desk of 
OCP based in Tokyo and Australia during the previous two years. This approach was also supported 
by the MSF International Regional Humanitarian Representative (RHR), who had also visited the 
authorities and developed relationships as part of the RHR mandate. 
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2.2 Operational choices 
Table 1: MSF Typhoon Haiyan timeline of key decisions and activities7 
Colour Code: OCB OCP OCA OCG OCBA 
 
 
 
* OCB initially identified a private hospital which was able to perform surgery before the decision was taken for OCB to provide surgical services 
** No figures for OCP treating patients between 13/11 and 16/11 
*** OCA did not support a hospital 
**** OCG supported an existing hospital structure 
                                                          
7
 Assessment reports, chronogram of activities and OC sitreps 
Key intervention milestones 08/11 09/11 10/11 12/11 13/11 14/11 15/11 16/11 17/11 18/11 20/11 21/11 22/11 23/11 24/11 27/11 30/11 
 
04/12 
Decision to intervene Typ
h
o
o
n
 H
aiyan
 Lan
d
fall  
                                              
Arrival Philippines                                             
Teams at project location                                               
First patient treated                                               
MSF supported Hospital 
functioning                                               
Commencement of surgery                                               
First NFI distribution                                               
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 
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2.2.1 Decision to go 
While some discussions took place in the emergency desks in both Paris and Brussels as well as in 
the emergency support positions in Tokyo and Hong Kong, no OC took a decision regarding the 
deployment of teams to the Philippines prior to the typhoon hitting the country. The typhoon made 
landfall on 8 November and both OCB and OCP decided to send emergency teams including 
personnel from the region on the 9th. MSF-OCA, OCG and OCBA, following short discussions with 
OCB and OCP, took the decision to go on 10 November. The different emergency teams arrived in 
the Philippines between the 10th (OCB and OCP) and the 12th (OCA, OCBA and OCG).  
 
2.2.2 Internal MSF pressure 
During the interview phase it was stated at both headquarters and field level that internal MSF 
pressure was felt especially by communication and fundraising teams. This was particularly relevant 
for partner sections. However, it must be made clear that this did not directly influence operational 
choices or decisions. It did create pressure and the question was raised whether the projects could 
do more and if needs had been properly assessed. Some emergency teams were regularly updated 
regarding fundraising and they were made aware of the fact that emergency finance was not an 
issue.  
 
2.2.3 Choice of operational locations 
The decision where each OC would intervene was made according to the arrival date in the country 
of each OC and their operational strategies. OCP who had chosen to send an inflatable hospital 
with surgery capacity established activities in Tacloban City where the reference medical structures 
were badly affected. The other OCs focused on the more remote areas affected by the emergency. 
MSF OCB quickly decided to assess Eastern Samar, where little information was available and 
typhoon Haiyan had made landfall. OCA assessed Ormoc in Western Leyte where the UN were not 
present yet. OCBA assessed the area south Leyte in Burauen while OCG decided to follow the 
direction of the typhoon and assessed Roxas Island in Western Visayas. MSF was able to put some 
areas such as Leyte and Ormoc on the map for other organisations. Some areas which were not so 
affected were ignored by most actors. 
The area around Cebu was also assessed in the initial stages but other organisations were present. 
The relationships between the different emergency coordinators also played a part as they knew 
each other.   
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Map of the locations of MSF’s primary projects 
 
 
2.2.3.1 OCP choices 
In Tacloban City, a large urban hub with more than 250 000 inhabitants, medical needs seemed to 
be more pre-eminent. Prior to the typhoon, Tacloban City was the health care hub with a  350-bed 
tertiary government referral medical centre for the region as well as the 25-bed Tacloban City 
Hospital which served approx. 200 000 inhabitants of the city. There were five other big private 
hospitals serving Leyte and nearby provinces. Almost all of these health structures were destroyed 
or partially damaged when the super typhoon hit the city, disrupting the health services of the city 
in particular and that of the region in general. 
OCP also intervened in Palo, Tanauan and Tolosa, in the coastal areas south of Tacloban with a 
population of around 70 000 inhabitants. All the towns’ health services halted after the typhoon as 
their health facilities were destroyed or damaged and rendered non-functional. The Leyte 
Provincial Hospital in Palo, which was catering for the whole province of Leyte, was destroyed and 
became non-functional. There was no transportation or if there was, then it was very expensive for 
the people to look for alternative health structures.  
 
2.2.3.2 OCB choices 
OCB assessed the area of Eastern Samar, specifically Guiuan city, by air. There the typhoon made 
landfall and little information was initially available. Although the area was heavily affected, the 
initial surge of relief efforts rather focused on the area of Tacloban city and the surrounding area 
and most aid actors did not extend their scope of activities until later on. Traditionally a somewhat 
neglected area, the population of Guiuan is poorer than most other areas affected by the typhoon, 
leading to the assumption that buildings and structures would have been heavily damaged. The 
target population of 100 000) is rather big and widespread and the area includes islands difficult to 
access off the peninsula where Guiuan city is located.  A majority of the medical structures in the 
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Guiuan Inter-local Health Zone, comprising five different municipalities, were left damaged and 
unusable. Obtaining access to potential victims of the disaster on the islands represented a major 
logistical challenge.  
 
2.2.3.3 OCA choices 
OCA assessment focused on Northern Leyte (on the path of the typhoon) and conducted several 
assessments in Ormoc/Santa Fe with a population 250 000 and surroundings; the area was 90% 
damaged but not devastated. All barangays (villages) in the area were affected. There were 16 
evacuations centres in the district. The more remote villages were not receiving aid even though 
some other organisations came in, e.g. Mercy Malaysia (OPD in hospital), Canadian Red Cross (IPD), 
Catholic Relief Services, Care (food distribution) but all located predominantly in Ormoc town.  
 
2.2.3.4 OCG choices 
OCG focused their attention on the west on the Island of Roxas in Western Visayas. When 
evaluating the situation, OCG teams noted that the Philippines’ government and population were 
organised and prepared for these kind of situations and had good coping mechanisms. Food 
distribution was organised, medical staff existed in the majority of the health clinics and hospitals 
as well as a good provision of drugs and vaccines. Many humanitarian actors were on the ground, 
more or less experienced, with the risk of overlapping in the assistance to the population. Twenty-
four organisations were seen on the ground in the capital of Capiz province in Roxas, including all 
the major UN actors, and the Canadian Armed Forces had their Disaster Assistance Response Team 
(DART) deployed in Roxas with 250 military staff, including 40 medical staff. Therefore, OCG 
decided to focus their intervention on the more remote areas, especially on islands along the east 
coast of Panay with medical consultations, emergency rehabilitation of clinics, distribution of non-
food items and sanitation in villages. 
 
2.2.3.5 OCBA choices 
OCBA did several assessments in southern Leyte province before reaching Burauen district. The 
level of destruction observed convinced the teams to intervene. Before the typhoon, Burauen 
District Hospital had a 75-bed capacity and was providing all the basic services, including surgery. 
The typhoon affected 75% of the hospital structure making it unusable. All consultations and 
admission of patients were done in the emergency room, lab services were interrupted, and there 
was no electricity. The hospital was overcrowded. The hospital director was one of five doctors 
usually present. Most of the health structures visited during the assessments had suffered at least 
partial damage and were suffering ruptures in drug supplies. A significant part of the residential 
areas assessed by OCBA teams were totally or partially damaged.   
 
2.2.4 Type of operations 
The scope of activities was similar amongst the different MSF OCs but with a different emphasis put 
on the stages of the emergency. The first stage is primarily emergency medical action, followed by 
the second stage of relief and recovery and the third stage of rehabilitation. The response activities 
were partly based on each OC’s strategy but were influenced by assessments of the different 
locations (areas differently affected, presence of other actors). 
OCP mainly focused on a medical intervention strategy. The decision to send the inflatable hospital 
was taken at the same time as the decision to intervene. It was set up in Tacloban city in the 
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grounds of Bethany private hospital (OPD, IPD, surgery, maternity, and neonatology). A tent 
hospital was also set up in the town of Tanauan, further south of Tacloban City, a coastal town also 
severely impacted by the typhoon (OPD, IPD, maternity). Mobile clinics took place in Tacloban 
surroundings for the first few weeks. An NFI distribution took place in the area of Tanauan.  
OCB took a wider approach in the area of Guiuan, an area hit hard by the typhoon. Medical 
activities were quickly established under tents in the previous hospital grounds as well as in the 
different RHU (regional health units) of the provincial zone. In addition, a programme of water and 
sanitation, shelter and NFI distribution activities were undertaken covering the area around Guiuan 
and the adjacent islands. OCB also distributed “context-developed” reconstruction kits to be shared 
by two families each and in a third stage (2014) built a semi-permanent modular hospital (achieved 
end of June 2014) to replace the hospital of Guiuan, which was destroyed during the typhoon.  
OCA mainly focused on responding to needs predominantly through mobile clinics with a few fixed 
clinic locations, distributing NFIs for people in evacuation centres and providing water and 
sanitation for towns and villages away from the main access roads. Minor rehabilitation of the 
hospital was provided in order for it to quickly become operational. After the initial assessments, 
the most heavily affected areas needed assistance beyond medical action. Although not initially 
planned, NFI kits for reconstruction were then distributed in Santa Fe municipality. It was quickly 
decided that the intervention would be short and within three weeks a decision was taken to close 
down the response and leave in January 2014. 
OCBA provided medical and logistical support to the health facilities in the area including Burauen 
District Hospital in order to restore their services as soon as possible. OCBA also provided medical 
support to clinics in the area and carried out shelter and NFI distributions as well as water trucking.  
OCG teams provided medical services through mobile clinics, support to the District Hospital of 
Balasan (referrals), rehabilitation of medical facilities, distribution of NFI as well as water and 
sanitation in the most remote villages. A blanket food distribution was undertaken by OCG 
beginning of December for 10 000 households. A specific intervention took place to establish an 
IDP camp when an oil spill affected a township in Estancia of Roxas Island as a consequence of the 
typhoon.  
 
2.2.5 Coordination/liaison 
 There was no common coordination structure in place so collaboration between OCs took place 
either through regular coordination meetings or bilaterally on an ad hoc basis. For the logistics and 
supply hub in Cebu, after a few days, a sharing of responsibilities and roles were developed to help 
avoid duplication.  
Overall, according to the teams of the different OCs, the intersectional coordination worked well 
which was said in part due to the personal relationship between the different coordination 
positions. What was important was the decision, taken in the first days following the typhoon, to 
have a centralised liaison post in Manila for representation and advocacy. This was highly 
appreciated by all, both internally and externally to MSF. This allowed a good flow of information 
between national and international bodies coordinating the emergency response and MSF teams 
on the ground, which resulted in a better understanding of who was doing what, when and with 
which outcomes. MSF was seen as one of the top five organisations or agencies in terms of sharing 
information with the authorities.  
At a headquarters level, apart from the initial contact between individual emergency desks and 
initial e-desk teleconferences coordinated by the international office there was no structured 
coordination in place. Information was shared between the desks on an adhoc basis. There is 
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currently no mechanism in place to coordinate in an emergency regarding areas of intervention, 
sharing of positions or information. At present this works on an adhoc basis. 
 
2.2.6 Mapping of activities 
It needs to be noted that the pre-typhoon health status of the population was relatively good and 
that the health system was well organised and functioning. 
 
2.2.6.1 Foreign Medical Teams 
In order to understand how MSF was represented amongst the international aid community in 
terms of medical aid, we used data provided by the new system of Foreign Medical Teams (FMT).  
The concept of FMTs was developed following the Haiti earthquake by the WHO. It consists of 
setting up standards and an accreditation system for medical teams. The Philippines response was 
the first emergency where the FMT registration system was put in place. For the Department of 
Health (DoH) supported by the WHO, it was a good tool to classify teams arriving in the field. Upon 
arrival in Cebu at the ‘one-stop shop’ medical teams were classified and their details put online.  
The classification of type I, type II and type III corresponds to primary, secondary and tertiary health 
care. The majority of teams were classified as Type I. There were only eleven registered type II 
FMTs and only two type III FMTs. MSF-OCP was classified as a Type III and the other OCs were 
classified as Type II. Being registered as an FMT meant that MSF had to report to the DoH and 
WHO. Not all teams registered or provided information on the type of activities they provided and 
for how long.  
 
Table 2: Aggregated services delivered by reporting registered-FMTs 8 
FMT Type   
Total 
registered 
Total 
teams 
reporting 
Total 
consultations 
Total 
admissions 
Total 
deliveries 
Total  
Total 
major 
surgeries 
Type 1 
Fixed 57 36 82 850 341 73 2 7 
Mobile 12 8 22 892 0 0 0 0 
Total 69 44 105 742 341 73 2 7 
Type 2   11 9 41 822 2 247 538 47 490 
Type 3 
China-M 1 1 48 48 4 n/a 40 
MSF-France 1 1 46 035 591 651 72 412 
Total 2 2 46 083 639 655 72 452 
Specialised   1 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total   83 55 193 647 3227 1266 121 949 
 
The data reported through the FMT/DOH register cover a larger period than the data that have 
been used in table 3 below. When comparing the different data, it can be shown that MSF provided 
more than 30% of consultations, hospitalisations and deliveries provided by all the registered FMTs. 
The data also show the essential role MSF played in terms of surgical cases, mainly through the OCP 
hospital in Tacloban. MSF provided 3 out of 11 type II FMTs as well as one of the two type III 
structures. It must be noted here that the China-M hospital ship was only present for two weeks, 
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which again emphasises the role of the OCP inflatable hospital. Regarding the fixed and mobile 
clinics, the number of clinics provided by MSF was not available but it was reported as a 
considerable percentage of the overall figure.  
While the FMTs played a key role, it is important to remember that the first response was provided 
by national medical teams and the DoH, who conducted the emergency response. It was not 
possible at the time of the evaluation to receive the DoH medical data to compare the input of the 
FMTs versus that of the existing health system. 
 
2.2.6.2 Medical activities 
Table 3 below presents the data on medical activities per OC for the period from week 46, three 
days after the typhoon, until the end of 2013.  
 
Table 3: Medical activities during the first seven weeks of the response9 
MEDICAL ACTIVITIES OCA OCBA OCB OCG OCP Total 
OPD consultations 5263 22 926 10 021 12 675 14 277 65 162 
Dressings* 473 1584 2503 436 2346 4996 
IPD** nr of admissions 0 357 498 0 535 1390 
OT activity 0 45 27 0 266 338 
Caesarean Sections 0 1 9 0 24 34 
Deliveries 0 92 108 0 160 360 
*Includes wounds  
**Includes maternal and neonatal admissions  
 
OCP maintained its medical focus during the intervention and most of their activities were medical 
and hospital-centred. In Tacloban, OCP decided to establish its inflatable hospital (55-bed) in the 
compound of Bethany Hospital with an emergency room, IPD, OPD, maternity, neonatal unit and 
operating theatre. The hospital was also equipped with a portable X-ray machine, ultrasound and a 
basic laboratory with blood transfusion capacity. Other activities included mental health, ante-
/postnatal care, family planning and medical outreach programmes. Bethany Hospital was chosen 
because it was the only place with enough space to erect the inflatable hospital. No ground 
belonging to the DoH was available. Part of the activities were established inside the surviving 
hospital structure, specifically surgery and laboratory, which allowed to send part of the inflatable 
hospital to Tanauan. Several other actors intervened in Tacloban, especially those who arrived very 
early (Australian Aid hospital-military). 
OCP decided to establish a 25-bed tent hospital in Tanauan with maternity, ER and IPD. An OPD was 
opened both in Tanauan and Tolosa. Mobile medical teams were also formed to go to the different 
barangays. Progressively, several other health actors also came and provided health care services 
for the population.  
OCB’s emergency response targeted the Guiuan Inter-Local Health Zone (Guiuan, Mercedes, 
Salcedo, Mac Arthur and Hernani). The Abrigo Memorial Hospital was the main district hospital in 
Guiuan. Before the typhoon, it was a level 1 hospital with a capacity of 50 beds including a delivery 
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room, X-ray machine, laboratory and operating theatre, which was mainly designated for 
Caesarean Sections (CS) and emergency surgeries. The hospital was significantly damaged by the 
typhoon, which is why MSF provided a tented hospital.  
The IPD activities started in week 47 with a capacity of 30 beds and increased to 60 beds by week 
49. The tented hospital was comprised of a maternity ward, adult ward, paediatric ward, an 
emergency and a delivery room. The OT was put in place only on the 4th of December because 
prior to this there was an agreement to use an existing private hospital with surgery capacity. The 
Guiuan RHU structure (not in the hospital) was partially destroyed due to the typhoon. A tent was 
provided for the OPD consultations and activities started in week 46. The RHU provided OPD 
activities as well as minor surgery and dressings. All deliveries, ANC and PNC consultations were 
referred to the temporary tented hospital. The OPD was also attached to a dispensary. The 
outreach medical activities started in week 48 on the mainland and islands for the five 
municipalities served by the Abrigo district hospital. Mainland outreach activities were stopped in 
week 50 as there were different actors providing health services.  
OCA’s medical intervention was implemented through mobile clinics and support to two fixed 
clinics, with the prioritisation on the main affected areas and most vulnerable population, including 
active facilitation of referrals to secondary care. The initial outline of the programme planned for a 
50% medical intervention, but within one to two weeks the teams on the ground came to the 
conclusion that health needs were not very high; in general, systems were in place but temporarily 
not functioning since one week due to the typhoon. There were no needs identified which needed 
to be addressed urgently. The total number of patients treated was lower than expected at the 
beginning. This was mainly due to the fact that other medical actors became active in the area and 
sometimes overlapped with MSF services.  
OCBA’s intervention consisted of support to the health facilities by providing human resources 
(HR), drugs and medical material and ensuring essential water/hygiene/sanitation requirements. In 
the hospital, MSF cleaned parts of the building that could be used and installed tents to perform 
the following services: ER, IPD, maternity, minor surgery (in the bubble OT that was set up in week 
50). A referral system through ambulance services was organised to Tacloban. OCBA also provided 
outreach activities in RHUs in the district. Mental health support was given within the IPD as well as 
community-based.  
OCG decided to provide support to mobile clinics in six municipalities and to the District Hospital of 
Balasan, which MSF used to refer all the patients from its mobile clinics. OCG also provided support 
in terms of drugs, HR, training for medical DoH staff on specific topics (in coordination with local 
and Provincial Health Authorities) and rehabilitation of the hospital due to the damages caused by 
the typhoon.  
 
2.2.6.3 Consultations 
 The main reasons for consultations were wounds, URTI and diarrhoea. The demand for these type 
of services is usually higher in the days following such disasters10. Therefore, we looked at the 
weekly data to see how appropriate the response was.  
In graph 1 a delay can be seen. A low number of consultations was done by MSF in the first week 
after the typhoon (week 46), the peak is situated in the second week with the number of 
consultations slowly decreasing afterwards. This can be explained by the late arrival of teams and 
supply on the ground.  
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In the report of the intervention OCA11 stated the following: 
"Ensure that right from the start of the intervention expats travelling to the field carry basic 
medical supplies with them to enable them to start activities, even if international cargo is 
delayed. Basic Units of the IEHK and first aid kits in the backpack version are suitable."  
 
For OCP, the focus was on setting up the hospital and a few medical activities were done prior to 
this. 
 
Graph 1: Total cumulative number of consultations for all OCs per week12 
 
 
Graph 2 shows that OCBA’s level of activities in terms of consultations was high, but the data 
recorded concerns the activities run in the structures supported by MSF but not necessarily 
performed by MSF staff. Whereas the data of the other OCs represent activities directly carried out 
by MSF medical teams. The graph also shows a significant decrease of activities after the third 
week, except for OCP. In Tacloban, many foreign teams (especially military) intervened early and 
left quickly. The high level of consultations maintained by OCP up to the end of the year can be 
explained by OCP absorbing the capacity provided by these organisations.  
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Graph 2: OPD consultations during the first seven weeks13 
 
*The first consultations took place during week 46, which began on 11 November, three days after Typhoon Haiyan made 
landfall.  
**Data are the total number of consultations of each OC from all locations combined.   
***OCBA supported health structures, whereas OCA and OCG conducted mobile clinics, and OCB and OCP provided 
services mainly through existing or temporary MSF structures.  
 
2.2.6.4 Surgery 
In terms of surgery, table 314 shows that the number of surgical interventions, apart from OCP, was 
relatively low considering the time frame. OCP ran surgery inside the inflatable hospital, which was 
used as a referral centre for the region; OCB also set up an OT under inflatable tents and OCBA 
trialled the bubble OT.   
 
2.2.6.5 Mental health activities 
The needs for mental health were expected given the characteristics of this natural disaster and 
previous experience, especially considering the following aspects: 
 high number of dead people   
 numerous survivors seeing family members drowning at their side and not being able to save 
them (feelings of guilt, especially in children)  
 numerous people having lost everything (homes, properties, means of living) and therefore 
being at risk for depression    
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However, the medical teams noted that strong resilience and coping mechanisms existed and were, 
amongst others, linked to strong family ties and community solidarity, religious spirit and the habit 
of frequent adverse natural disasters, even if expressing sadness and psychic distress is not really 
tolerated in this cultural context. Prior to the typhoon, mental health services in the region were 
very scarce. This justifies MSF’s mental health intervention. Furthermore, after the end of the MSF 
intervention, medical authorities decided to continue developing mental health services.  
Mental health has been integrated by all OCs and the different interventions focused on various 
target groups such as children, vulnerable populations but also medical staff. Especially for health 
staff the DoH identified the need for mental health support after the disaster in order to foster 
their coping mechanisms. They were identified as a neglected group. 
 
Table 4: Mental health activities during the first seven weeks15 
MENTAL HEALTH ACTIVITIES OCA OCBA OCB** OCG OCP 
Group sessions 54 74 196 29 132 
Nr of participants in group discussions 1630 769 4606 2906 2515 
Individual consultations 401 48 80 374 404 
Psycho-educational sessions 164 117 125 *0 *0 
Nr of participants in psycho-educational sessions  4186 9406 3852 *0 *0 
*No data currently available for the number of participants of each group session  
**Until end of February 2014  
 
Some OCs raised concerns regarding the lack of inclusion of treatment for psychiatric conditions in 
the emergency intervention. In such disasters, psychiatric services often become non-operational, 
as was the case in Tacloban. However, sometimes patients already are on anti-psychotic 
medication or present with severe symptoms following the disaster. In such cases patients need 
psychotropic drugs and psychological care and, as in other chronic diseases, continuity in their 
treatment. 
 
2.2.6.6 Water and sanitation activities  
All sections conducted water and sanitation activities in health structures and ensured provision of 
water to hospitals and RHRs, which they were either supporting or running directly. All OC’s, except 
OCP, also performed water and sanitation activities for the general population focusing either on 
most populated areas or on more remote areas. The range of activities covered water trucking, 
water provision by bladders, chlorination, well cleanings, provision of hand pumps and provision of 
latrines. In table 5, the provision of water provided has been represented by cubic metres rather 
than number of beneficiaries as there was insufficient data available from enough OCs. 
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Table 5: Water and sanitation activities16 
WATSAN ACTIVITIES OCA OCBA OCB OCG 
Water trucking/bucket chlorination: pop assisted   32 967 8165 23 345 ** 
Total m3 treated water provided   3710 993 4103 ** 
Target population Aqua tab/chlorine donation 28 200 2996 ** ** 
Aqua tab/chlorine donation in m3 of potable water supply 35 071 0 ** 12 000 
Well cleaning 0 0 62 37 
*OCP provided Watsan support to their health facilities but there is no information available regarding community 
activities  
**No data currently available for activities provided 
Both OCA and OCB ran the most comprehensive intervention in terms of water and sanitation. The 
one difference being that OCB supported the re-establishment of the water system in Guiuan which 
was 90% destroyed by the typhoon. In addition a well cleaning campaign was conducted in Guiuan 
town and outreach locations. 
 
2.2.6.7 NFI, shelter, food distributions 
Table 6: Non-food item and shelter distribution17 
NFI/shelter distribution  OCA OCBA OCB OCG OCP 
Hygiene kits  1093 12 115 2896 452 3000 
NFI kits  2009 3819 3238 10 256 3000 
Jerry cans  14 811 1215 960 6000 
Blankets  6874 3760 1604 21 850 
Tents  3846 2956 1529 1500 
Tarpaulins  9855 2280 1874  
Shelter reconstruction kit 4820 1250 2000   
* Cannot be compared like for like as the distributions did not consist of the same items  
 
Non-food items: All OCs distributed NFIs on various scales, targeting the most affected and isolated 
populations. However, items distributed and the composition of the various kits differed greatly 
between OCs.    
Shelter: In anticipation of incoming typhoons, the Philippines authorities encourage the population 
to move or to take shelter in evacuation shelters, generally schools or public buildings not 
specifically constructed for this purpose. During typhoon Haiyan, some evacuation centres were 
damaged themselves, and in some areas (coastal areas, islands), the level of individual houses 
destroyed were impressive. 
In the first stage, tents and tarpaulins were distributed by all OCs except OCA, using either 
individual household or communal approach. In the second stage, some OCs decided to distribute 
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reconstruction kits to support families that had lost their homes. These distributions were targeted 
towards the more remote populations most of the time. Three OCs distributed shelter kits, but 
their compositions were different. Whereas OCA’s and OCBA’s shelter kits were mainly consisting 
of tools, OCB decided to propose a full kit comprising of plywood, corrugated roofing and marine 
proof wooden beams, in order to give full means to families to rebuild homes, in an area that was 
particularly damaged. 
Food: OCG was the only one distributing food mid-December, as they noted that access to food 
became an increasing problem especially on the islands. They targeted 10 856 households; 9’892 
households were provided with food by MSF and 964 households were served by ACF, additionally 
a total of 48 tons of high energy biscuits were provided to supplement the food baskets from WFP. 
Following its food distribution, OCG lobbied for other organisations, more specifically WFP, in order 
for this type of intervention to be renewed. 
 
2.2.6.8 Supply 
All supplies transited Cebu airport, which was not prepared to receive large cargo shipments and 
became quickly overwhelmed. It was described as a bottleneck. All steps were challenging; customs 
clearance, unloading planes, finding warehouses, organising transport by plane or by boat for 
example. Whereas OCB placed a dedicated team of five people for supply in Cebu very early on, the 
organisation of the other OCs in terms of supply was “lighter” and concerns were raised during the 
interview that the supply strategies of some OCs remain an issue to be worked on.  
As some OCs questioned their setup in terms of supply, they propose a different organisation for 
next time. OCA18 states the following in its final report: 
"Even if the intervention is intended to be small scale, the initial setup and cargo reception 
will require substantial logistical input. We should not limit ourselves by sending only a five-
expat team as was the approved initial team. Not considering the capacity needed for the 
actual activities, a Log Coordinator, a base log per location and a supply log in coordination to 
receive international cargo as well as a full purchase log should be the minimum team."   
In an OCP report from Eric Pujo Colog the following is stated: 
"At the beginning of the operation the number of logisticians in Cebu was not enough for all 
the international freight reception and created some disorganisation within the team. The 
following was proposed for a future set-up: 1 supply coordinator; 1 on air strip for reception 
of freight & dispatch; 1 on air strip for military planes (organisation & follow-up); 1 in custom 
office for clearance and truck loading; 1 in MSF warehouse (reception & truck loading); 1 in 
charge of supply delivery to the field" . 
 
2.2.7 Cost of the interventions 
As can be seen from the raw data of the financial accounts per OC, there is a clear disparity in 
spending during the first seven weeks of the emergency with regards the total amount spent by 
each OC. As can be seen, OCB spent €8,210,314 while OCA spent €1,002,229 during the first 7 
weeks. This overall figure does not explain the reasons behind the difference in spending levels for 
each OC which we have tried to explain below.  
 
Table 7: Budget spending between 8 November and 31 December 201319 
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Philippines 2013 expenses Total expenditure OCB OCP OCA OCBA OCG 
International staff € 1 654 998 468 453 457 086 220 199 209 876 299 384 
National staff € 345 369 82 215 109 590 59 213 26 341 68 010 
Medical and nutrition € 2 893 873 1 165 452 772 266 88 910 277 164 590 081 
Logistics and sanitation € 6 599 782 3 550 010 1 159 073 327 069 1 001 351 562 279 
Transport, freight, storage € 5 448 460 2 747 454 895 090 242 631 913 727 649 558 
Others € 540 357 196 730 110 809 64 207 31 209 137 402 
TOTAL in Euros €17 482 838 8 210 314 3 503 914 1 002 229 2 459 668 2 306 713 
*’Others’ includes operational running costs, training and local support, consultants and field support and others 
 
Graph 3: Percentage of total budget spent per OC20 
 
 
Graph 3 above shows that OCB was responsible for 47% of the overall spending in the first seven 
weeks of the emergency while OCA accounted for only 6%. In part this can be explained by the fact 
that while most OCs focused on remote locations, OCB intervened in the most affected area which 
was more difficult to access and required expensive transport solutions but it is also linked to 
operational choices and strategies as explained in chapter 2.2. For example, OCB like OCG, 
provided assistance to island communities badly affected by the disaster. As can be seen by the 
pictures below this added an additional complexity and cost to the intervention. The island 
assistance comprised of health care and several stages of NFI and shelter distributions including 
shelter kits which were designed to provide a temporary replacement structure21. 
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In addition, OCA, OCG and OCBA all took the decision to close their projects and leave in January 
quite quickly as the needs decreased. Therefore, the majority of their spending took place during 
the first 3 to 4 weeks of the emergency, whereas both OCP and OCB continued their activities in 
2014. 
Graph 4 shows that within all OCs, except for OCG, the largest expenditure during the first seven 
weeks was for logistics and sanitation followed by transport/freight and storage. The difference for 
OCG was the implementation of a food distribution included within the medical/nutrition column. 
The expenditure on logistics/sanitation and transport/freight/storage is a direct result of the issues 
relating to the emergency where the medical needs were quickly addressed and the need for non-
medical assistance was identified by the teams as a requirement which was addressed through 
Watsan, shelter and non-food item distributions. It must be noted that while each budget line is the 
same, what the money is spent is not necessarily the same. For example regarding shelter, the 
actual components of the shelter package offered by each OC is different. Therefore it is not always 
possible to compare from a financial or reporting perspective in the responses from each OC. Not 
all NFI or shelter distributions contain the same items and costs associated with the distributions 
vary depending upon ease of access to the targeted communities. 
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Graph 4: Budget spent per OC for the main financial 
lines22
 
 
In graph 5 it is interesting to compare the actual expenses per main budget line as an overall 
percentage for each OC intervention. For OCB and OCBA, logistics/sanitation and transport/freight 
and storage comprised 76% and 78% of their budgets respectively. OCP, OCG and OCA spent 59%, 
52% and 57% respectively. The main difference can be explained for OCB with their strategy and 
type of shelter distribution, which included the hiring of a barge to distribute the assembled shelter 
kits and for OCBA with their provision of the largest NFI distribution in quantity. During the 
interviews some expressed that there was an element of ‘over-shooting’ by OCB with regards to 
the procurement of non-medical items, which could also explain the budget line. As part of the OCB 
exit strategy, several containers were sent to Sierra Leone and Cameroun containing medical and 
non-medical items worth €1,206 806 to be used in other projects or re-integrated into the supply 
system in Brussels. 
Regarding the medical analysis, as a percentage spent, OCA, OCB and OCBA are very similar, even 
though they had different strategies and with OCB and OCBA supporting hospital structures. One 
would expect OCP, through the provision of an inflatable hospital with surgery (type III FMT) to 
have a higher cost percentage regarding the medical budget and OCG, once the nutrition 
component is removed, to be more in line with the other OCs.  
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Graph 5: Percentage of budget spent per OC by budget line23 
 
*‘Other’ includes operational running costs, training and local support, consultants and field support and others 
 
This disparity can be explained to some extent by the locations where each OC responded; Guiuan 
in Eastern Samar was the most affected area with issues of accessibility, presence of fewer actors 
and the capacity to assist a dispersed population targeting Island communities, whereas in Roxas 
Island, Western Visayas, the resulting damage, size of affected population and subsequent needs 
where much less. 
 
2.2.8 Timeliness 
The ability to be operationally quickly when responding to a natural disaster, especially in the first 
days, is seen as crucial to meeting the medical needs of those most affected. In relation to the 
Philippines emergency, MSF was not the first on the ground but one of the first present with a 
response capacity. Other actors/journalists were able to get there first but with little or no 
equipment to respond. It is often perceived and experienced that in these type of emergencies the 
military is often quicker than MSF to be operational. However, in this emergency that was not the 
case in all locations. In Guiuan US/Philippines military secured the airport and helped clearing roads 
but did not provide medical services. This was different to Tacloban, where several military teams 
provided medical programmes but for a limited time frame. 
MSF was not operational on the ground until five days after the typhoon struck. From a pure time 
frame perspective, MSF was late considering the possibility within the region to send a small team 
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prior to the typhoon making landfall. OCB and OCP took the decision to intervene on 9 November 
and arrived in the Philippines on the 10th, then 2/3 additional days passed respectively until arriving 
in the subsequent project locations. While this delay can be questioned, the reality can be 
explained by the fact that MSF was not already present, there was no direct access to Eastern 
Visayas (Leyte and Eastern Samar provinces) and all logistics and supply were centralised through a 
logistics hub that was opened for the response by the authorities in Cebu, a neighbouring Island 
with limited airport logistics capacity. There were issues of securing means of transport with 
competition from other actors and between MSF teams and Tacloban airport not initially being 
open for air access. The DoH and Save the Children prepositioned medical and non-medical stocks 
in Tacloban which were lost due to the intensity of the typhoon and the 5 metres sea surge that 
followed. 
Some operational choices can also be seen as having led to a delay in providing hospital services. 
The OCP inflatable hospital was not opened until 22 November, 14 days after the emergency. This 
was partly due to a week’s delay in transporting it from Cebu to Tacloban.  
 
2.2.9 Exit strategy 
OCA, OCG and OCBA had planned a short intervention between six weeks and two months from 
the beginning. With the main medical needs being met quite quickly, it allowed for each OC to plan 
early for their exit strategy. They started to reduce their activities mid-December and terminated 
their projects between January and February 2014 handing over activities mainly to local 
authorities and in some cases to other NGOs or discontinuing those that were only meant as a 
response to emergency needs after the disaster. 
Table 8:  MSF Typhoon Haiyan timeline of end of activities for OCG/OCA/OCBA 
 Timing 2013/2014 Week 51 Week 52 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
End of medical activities OCG OCA OCBA   
End of distributions OCG  OCBA   
 OCA     
End of Watsan activities  OCG OCA OCBA  
Last team on grounds     OCA 
      OCG 
      OCBA 
 
OCP stated its intention of planning a long-term intervention in the Philippines, which would not be 
linked to the Haiyan Typhoon emergency, early. By the end of 2013, a decision was made to merge 
the two emergency projects (Tacloban and Tanauan/Tolosa), considering the restart of some 
activities by DOH in some locations, the decreasing of the emergency in terms of the number of 
relative cases directly linked to the typhoon, the proximity of the two settings and the possibility to 
have referral systems between them. In January, the OPD in Tanauan remained open; the OPD in 
Tolosa and the IPD in Tanauan were closed.  
In Tacloban, as repairs were done at Bethany hospital, activities run by the national medical 
hospital staff took place again, with some adaptations made around the question of free health 
care and MSF progressively withdrawing from the project. Considering the damages in the province 
of Leyte, OCP then decided to support the rehabilitation of the provincial hospital in Palo, with a 
specific objective to render it able to provide maternal and child care, and practising Caesarean 
Sections. MSF was planning to reinforce the medical teams in this hospital from May 2014 to 
develop the capacities of this hospital. Following the emergency, OCP conducted exploratory 
missions to identify future longer term projects. 
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OCB included the recovery phase as part of an intervention in response to such a natural disaster. 
Knowing that long-term reconstruction starts later and will become effective years after, there is a 
need to ensure the intermediary period. Having that in mind, OCB decided in December 2013 to 
construct a modular hospital to replace the temporary tented structure that would not be able to 
support the next typhoon/rainy season. The modular hospital was considered as a semi-permanent 
solution, meaning that it was guaranteed for five years. The construction of this hospital was run as 
a separate project managed by the logistics department in the headquarters. While the initial 
budget of the modular hospital was of €3.5 M, the actual cost was €2.5M (construction/Watsan: 1 
360 000 €, freight/transport and storage: €685 000, HR: €430 000). 
This project raised some concerns amongst the teams in the field. There was a general agreement 
on the necessity for MSF to provide a mid-term solution for the hospital in Guiuan, the previous 
one being destroyed and with no possibility of repairs, a replacement hospital was not expected 
before 2 or 3 years, and no other actors ready to invest for the midterm period. However, the 
“ready to use “ solution that was adopted was considered as not having explored enough 
alternative solutions, such as local ones (using more local materials, employing more local human 
resources ) as well as not having taken in consideration the consequences of establishing such a 
structure with its constraints (number of human resources, services, size etc.) The land was 
privately owned but this was the only solution, as no municipal or DoH land was available at the 
time. 
The decision was taken in Brussels considering not only the importance of recovery but also seeing 
it as a pilot initiative to test the ability of MSF to provide a safe health structure in a short time 
period (three months was the objective installation time-frame). 
Meanwhile, the teams continued to provide support in specific departments of the hospital and run 
outreach water and sanitation activities (well cleanings and installation of water pumps was seen as 
the exit strategy from water trucking). At the beginning of the year, a second batch of construction 
materials was distributed. Operational research on Dengue prevention also took place during the 
first semester of 2014. OCB finally handed over and exited the Philippines in October 2014. 
 
2.2.10   Constraints/obstacles  
The environment is generally reported as a favourable one considering the facilities and support 
provided and organised by the national authorities, the space to intervene and the absence of 
major security concerns. The main obstacles described by the different operational teams were, 
not surprisingly, related to supply and logistics. In such a major and media driven emergency, a 
huge number of relief cargos will be sent to the affected areas during a very short period of time.   
 
2.2.11   Role of communication 
The size of the communications team sent to the Philippines was questioned by some when 
comparing with other ongoing emergencies at the time, such as Central African Republic. In reality, 
this emergency had captivated the international media and would have been difficult to avoid 
especially after MSF had responded operationally.  
 
2.3 Role of regional offices 
The review examined the existing resources and capacity which existed in the region and was either 
available or used as part of the Haiyan response. In addition, the regional strategies being 
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developed by the different MSF offices (Hong Kong, Japan and Australia) were looked at with 
regards to the question of added value. 
 
2.3.1 Regional office capacity 
Within the three regional offices there has been an investment in resources aimed at providing a 
monitoring and networking capacity. MSF Japan and Australia, with the support of MSF France, 
invested in a regional emergency preparedness role which was shared between the Australia and 
Japan offices. Its main role was to build up links, networking and context monitoring. Several 
assessments were also conducted, especially in the Philippines, linked to possible emergencies 
resulting in small interventions. The decision to discontinue this position was taken prior to 
Typhoon Haiyan but remained in place at the time of the emergency.  
There was also a Tokyo desk but it was not directly involved in the management of the emergency. 
The desk will close next year, but one position remains, a super-log of the desk which is based in 
the Philippines and working in the ongoing OCP projects. This position will also have the 
responsibility of emergency surveillance within the region, linked to MSF Japan. 
MSF Hong Kong is the most developed in relation to establishing a regional capacity through an 
Operational Support Team24 (OPS). This was established in 2012 and incorporates three primary 
components of which one is seconded from the International Office; 
 Emergency Response Support Unit (ERSU, established 2010): Emergency Preparedness and 
Response 
 Programme Development Unit (PDU): Research and Context Monitoring 
 Regional Humanitarian Representation (RHR-International MSF position): Advocacy and 
Representation-ASEAN 
The RHR role is planned to move to Jakarta, Indonesia, during 2015 for proximity to ASEAN 
networking. The main role of this unit is to provide a similar role to monitor emergencies in South 
East Asia and to provide a response support; ideally after getting a buy-in from an OC. From the 
Hong Kong office perspective, the capacity in the region has improved markedly with many 
assessments having been undertaken but no response as yet required. The OST geographical 
coverage is focused on Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and China. In addition, 'Antennas' have been established 
in different countries using former MSF expatriates to engage regularly with the authorities and 
humanitarian actors within their countries. They are also to be alerted for emergencies and 
available for deployment in case of emergencies. This network is changing regularly and training is 
provided as required. 
Apart from having shared the emergency position with MSF Japan, MSF Australia has developed a 
register of expats available for emergency response. There was a good coordination and 
information sharing between the positions based within the region which impacted positively 
during the initial days with good working relationships already having been established.  
 
2.3.1.1 Typhoon Haiyan support 
Prior to the typhoon making landfall, updates were sent from the Hong Kong office to the different 
OCs and while seen as useful in some cases, it was not clearly stated that they were not used as a 
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decision making tool prior to the emergency. Not all OCs remembered receiving or using the 
information that had been provided. It is also not clear if the information replaced or provided 
something different than what already existed in each OC. 
Discussions did take place on whether the two emergency roles from Hong Kong and Japan should 
pre-position themselves in the Philippines but it was decided against it.25 The first teams to arrive in 
the Philippines were from the Hong Kong and Japan offices. The networking and relationship 
building undertaken in the months before was definitely seen as a benefit which opened doors and 
allowed a quick response/contact with the authorities which was very much based on the 
developed personal relationships.  
Both the regional emergency positions, following their arrival in the Philippines, quickly assumed 
coordination roles for OCB and OCP, based in Guiuan and Tacloban respectively.  
 
2.3.1.2 Regional HR support 
This was seen as one of the most important aspects of regional capacity which was utilised to the 
benefit of the emergency response. MSF Hong Kong, through their regional human resource 
recruitment was able to contact Philippines and other expatriates from the region, on their lists and 
quickly activate a group of experienced human resources available to respond as part of the initial 
emergency teams. During the first week of the emergency, 18 staff were contracted/detached or 
facilitated through the Hong Kong office. In total 37 positions were filled through the Hong Kong 
office until the beginning of January 2014 and came from Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Philippines, Hong Kong and China, Belgium, Austria and Pakistan. 21 of these positions were from 
the Philippines.  
At the time it was thought that this HR support was provided to all sections and responded to the 
aim of MSF Hong Kong to be a regional resource to the MSF movement. When checked the reality 
however was that of the 37 expats and national staff supported through the Hong Kong office, only 
five worked for OCP, OCA and OCG. The remainder worked for OCB. Of the 145 expatriate OCB 
positions up until October 2014, 32 or 22% were filled by MSF Hong Kong. 
Several coordination positions were filled through the HR from the Hong Kong office including e.g.  
emergency, medical, project and human resources coordinator roles. One additional benefit of the 
availability of Philippines human resources was their ability to activate local networks and contacts 
which provided a very positive impact on the teams and was a very useful resource. 
Additional HR support was provided through communication positions from Hong Kong and 
Australia which were geared towards the general communication needs of MSF. MSF Japan also 
provided Japanese international staff and supported OCP and OCG through sourcing suppliers: 
getting contacts for boats and plane as well as providing free satellite phones and running costs and 
free flights for Japanese staff. 
The final HR support was the placement of the RHR position in Manila to act as a liaison officer for 
MSF towards the authorities and other actors. This has been covered in an earlier section and was 
seen as a very successful deployment. 
While MSF Hong Kong wishes to provide a strong regional presence offering services to all of MSF, 
in this emergency the support and resources were very orientated to OCB needs. If this continues 
to be the case in such future situations, then the added value of a regional office providing support 
to the MSF movement as a whole will be diminished. It also reinforces the perception in other OCs 
that MSF Hong Kong's primary focus in an emergency will remain towards OCB and cannot be relied 
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upon as an additional resource when OCB decides to respond alongside other OCs. It is not clear 
how much of the context analysis undertaken by the PDU is currently being utilised by each section 
of MSF. It could be of interest to evaluate this component separately. 
 
2.4 Perception and added value 
MSF's general response to Typhoon Haiyan was overall very favourable with positive feedback from 
both the authorities and other organisations. MSF was perceived to have been timely, good at 
sharing information, providing a wide geographical coverage, able to work independently and 
provided the services communicated to the authorities. MSF was seen by the World Health 
Organisation as one of the main contributors to the Foreign Medical Teams surveillance which was 
being used for the first time in a large scale emergency. MSF contributed a significant proportion of 
the FMTs and the resulting consultations and inpatient services. 
UNOCHA, who coordinated the shelter cluster, viewed the shelter contribution provided by MSF as 
making an important contribution to the overall shelter response. The strategy undertaken by OCB 
was particularly highlighted as pertinent, especially with the focus on remote and difficult to access 
communities.  
The departure of MSF was also seen as positive with the authorities informed of the exit strategies 
and attempts to coordinate or handover activities during the handover. The strategy of OCB was 
particularly highlighted as a good example as it switched quickly from emergency to recovery and 
as part of the exit strategy included a mid-term solution to the provincial health care needs through 
the provision of a modular hospital, replacing for up to five years the destroyed fixed type 1 
hospital. 
MSF was rated by the DoH as one of the top five organisations or agencies in terms of sharing 
information both at field and capital level. Similar feedback was also received from UN agencies, 
with the recognition that this was a change from previous responses, and while MSF was not seen 
as a cluster member, the participation and presence of MSF at cluster meetings was seen as 
pertinent. 
From the perspective of the DoH, when discussing the relevance of MSF providing medical 
assistance during natural disasters, MSF was recognised as having played a significant role which 
allowed the authorities to focus on other needs and geographical areas where MSF was not 
present. The ability for MSF to work independently, requiring minimal logistical or supply support 
was highlighted as one of the main benefits of MSF’s role in the disaster response.  
MSF was perceived to have been timely and while not necessarily the first organisation on the 
ground MSF’s capacity to be able to quickly establish access to health care was comparable to 
other actors including the military teams. On this point, it was also noted that a large part of the 
foreign military response teams stayed only a short time and the capacity of MSF replaced their 
activities after their departure, especially through the OCP inflatable hospital in Tacloban. It should 
be repeated here that through the inflatable hospital MSF provided one of only two type III level of 
access to health care as a foreign medical team26. The only other registered type III access was 
provided by the Chinese peace ship, which stayed only two weeks and treated 48 patients. 
Through its activities targeting isolated and remote communities, specifically the affected islands, 
MSF provided important access to health care. For the authorities and WHO, this assistance 
identified an inequality in access to health care, which existed prior to the emergency. It was noted 
by WHO that in such situations, if MSF shared their data and information with WHO, they could 
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follow up with the authorities to try and address these issues after the emergency. Also, through 
the mental health activities of MSF and others, it was expressed by the authorities that a gap in 
needs had been highlighted that would be addressed after the emergency.  
While discussing how MSF can continue to respond to emergencies in the Philippines in the future, 
UNOCHA explained that they regularly respond to emergencies during a calendar year by 
continually opening and closing coordination offices and being very flexible with their approach. No 
permanent UNOCHA offices exists in the provinces. While there are several emergencies during a 
year, the coping capacity of the authorities and organisations usually means that the needs are 
often short-termed. 
Regarding post-emergency projects, it was expressed by several organisations that there are 
significant challenges to find projects to spend the allocated funds raised during the appeals. There 
is competition between organisations to find projects which are in addition to pre-existing projects. 
The 'Build Back Better' approach from the authorities to ensure that the rehabilitation process of 
the infrastructure managed by the government means that only short-term and low cost 
rehabilitation is being requested in the short-term while the longer term planning takes place. For 
example, a post-emergency assessment of 28 health clinics in Eastern Samar province undertaken 
by OCP identified only two structures which required some rehabilitation support, because there 
were already plans or organisations providing support to the other 26. 
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3 Conclusion and discussion 
 
Overall the response by MSF to Typhoon Haiyan was well perceived by all involved – with good 
geographical coverage, including a focus on the more rural and isolated communities, pertinent 
activities and services, a timely response compared to other actors, excellent coordination and 
information sharing with the authorities and other actors and good communication relating to the 
different exit strategies.  
The response was timely compared to other actors, but the first MSF consultations were only done 
six days after the emergency and MSF’s surgical services commenced only after two weeks. MSF 
missed the opportunity to send small regional teams prior to the emergency which could 
potentially have saved a day or two but this is not definite. The focus on rural and isolated 
communities, such as the islands, was an important strategy with high impact. In pure time terms 
relating to the treatment of the injured following a natural disaster, it can be said that MSF was late 
in some locations. 
In relation to the registered FMTs, when comparing the data provided by WHO and MSF, it is 
possible to conclude that MSF was a major contributor of medical care and provided +/-30% of the 
total consultations, hospitalisations and deliveries from the FMTs. MSF-OCP provided the only type 
III unit under the FMT register, which remained longer than two weeks. 
The very low surgical activities done by OCB and OCBA raised the question of pertinence of the 
decision to send and setup an OT, especially as they were not functioning until two weeks after the 
typhoon. This indicates that MSF’s medical role in such a natural disaster (in a country where MSF is 
not present) will not be the immediate care of the wounded, but is more orientated towards the 
re-establishing of health care services that have been interrupted because of the disaster.  
There was an identified gap in the provision of treatment of patients with diagnosed psychiatric 
conditions whose care and treatment has been disrupted as a consequence of this emergency. 
MSF activities were seen as helping to identify gaps that existed prior to the emergency and acted 
as a stimulus for being continued as part of the normal health care services. It was mentioned that 
if MSF can coordinate and update the WHO, then it is possible that the WHO can play a role after 
the emergency in addressing the gaps in access to health care identified by organisations like MSF.  
MSF used this specific emergency to pilot or test new tools or strategies: the bubble OT (OCBA), 
modular hospital and reconstruction kits (OCB). OCB also gained experience in this specific context 
in terms of its capacities to set up the inflatable OT.  
The presence of five OCs allowed for a good geographical coverage which was appreciated by the 
authorities and it allowed for a good contextual understanding and provision of a wide range of 
assistance. The fact that all OCs were present was not seen as a negative but many of those 
interviewed in hindsight thought three sections would have been sufficient. The evaluation findings 
echo this opinion. In a context where there is a capacity to respond to emergencies which are a 
regular occurrence and where there is an active civil society and other organisations are present, 
there is no obvious justification for 5 OCs.   
The question however in these large scale emergencies, under such media coverage is how an OC 
can avoid sending a team to assess the situation, especially when there are no other operational 
priorities, which in the case of Typhoon Haiyan was the reality. There is no current mechanism to 
quickly agree how many OCs should respond nor who would be given priority. 
There was a cost disparity regarding the different operational choices and strategies which resulted 
in a wide difference between budgets. The disparity between the sections is explained firstly by 
their different policies towards a natural disaster response and secondly on the location of each 
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OC; which was a major factor in subsequent operational choices and the strategies of each OC. 
Because of their policy commitments, OCP and OCB were the first to decide to intervene; hence 
they chose the areas most affected. In addition, it must be remembered that both OCP and OCB 
continued to provide services in 2014, whereas OCA, OCBA and OCG all took the decision to wind 
down their activities in December and exit in January 2014. Proportionately, there was not a huge 
difference in terms of costs of activities when the figures are broken down which cannot be 
explained by the chosen strategies. 
The MSF response was perceived as having had an added value and played an important role in the 
overall response, especially regarding the input provided by MSF as part of the foreign medical 
teams. In addition, the strategy of MSF-OCB was particularly highlighted as an example by the 
authorities and UN agencies, especially WHO and UNOCHA which addressed the short and mid-
term needs required by the communities and authorities.  
The main obstacle remains the difficulty of access in natural disasters. From an MSF perspective 
the issue of supply remains a constraint, even though this doesn’t seem to be the case for OCB. 
How many resources are allocated towards managing supply in an emergency is still an issue for 
some OCs. Initially insufficient resources were provided to manage the supply chain in Cebu and 
solutions to share roles and responsibilities between OC teams were ad hoc and not pre-defined. 
There is no agreed strategy or structure in place prior to an emergency on how to collaborate and 
share responsibilities and resources and prevent competition between supply teams during an 
emergency.  
The role of the regional offices, especially Hong Kong, was very useful regarding the provision of 
human resources; particularly experienced by Philippine staff. However, there were missed 
opportunities to send teams prior to the typhoon making landfall. However, whether this would 
have made an impact is debatable, but the opportunity was there. MSF Hong Kong’s wish to 
support all OCs did not materialise as desired with the majority of support being directed towards 
OCB, especially human resources. There remains the question regarding the roles of the regional 
offices and requests for this to be clarified within the movement. 
While natural disaster policies exist in each OC, few are clearly formalised and none have been 
updated recently.  
The management of information was again a problem for the Philippines evaluation with the some 
of the documentation difficult to retrieve or find the relevant information. Not all information was 
initially available and the differences in how information is reported in each OC make the collection 
and analysis of the information both time consuming and difficult. As this problem has been 
repeatedly identified in evaluations, no particular recommendation is made, but MSF may want to 
consider addressing it. 
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4 Recommendations 
 
 Each OC should update or establish a written natural disaster policy and share with the different 
OCs. A common discussion should take place between OCs to identify complementarity 
strategies and activities and define areas of specific investment for example, shelter, supply, 
Watsan, NFI. 
 
 Regarding the implementation of the mid-term modular hospital solution it is recommended as 
part of the ongoing learning process to conduct a specific evaluation of its pertinence and cost, 
integrating its functioning after 1 to 2 years. 
 
 MSF should consider implementing a liaison position for MSF international representation in a 
large scale emergency providing the link between the authorities and other agencies at national 
level. 
 
 MSF medical teams should be able to provide first care to the populations in need as early as 
possible. This could mean a dedicated specific mobile team to conduct this activity in the very 
early stages, in parallel to teams conducting assessments. In addition, it needs to be ensured 
that necessary supplies are available for teams when they arrive on site. 
 
 Each OC should consider psychiatric patients to be included in mental health strategies. 
 
 Each OC should consider how to reinforce supply lines when responding to natural disasters on 
such a scale. If there is the commitment between the OCs, the emergency supply set-up and 
shared intersectional positions should be discussed as part of the working group. 
 
 The ExCom and RIOD should be clear on their vision for the role of the regional offices. Different 
approaches are possible: 
 OC lead i.e. regional offices linked to specific OC 
 Multiple approach where different regional offices provide support to different OCs 
 Hong Kong lead providing resources and support to the movement from the region 
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5 Annex 
 
5.1 Terms of reference 
Terms of reference for Haiyan critical review 
 
Commissioned by MSF Executive Committee 
Duration of evaluation 10 weeks 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 
Typhoon Haiyan hit the central Philippines on 8 November 2013. 16 million people lost their homes 
or livelihoods and more than 6.000 people were killed.  
MSF put in place a big emergency operation to respond to the humanitarian needs.  
All 5 Operational Centres decided to intervene in this emergency, operational engagement and 
choices varied significantly, with the proxy indicator of finances showing a striking differences 
ranging from some spending below 1 million euro while others going above 10 million euro. MSF 
spent a similar amount for the tsunami in 2006, which affected a much wider range of people and 
countries. 
The MSF Executive Committee has requested to undertake a review of MSF response to this 
emergency from an operational and a fundraising perspective (not part of these TOR). The 
operational critical review will analyse the operational strategies put in place by each OC and the 
use of regional capacity (MSF, HK, Japan and Australia) and their added value in the response. This 
review should not aim to be a fully exhaustive but provide the main elements in terms of 
timeliness, relevance, (regional) support, differences around operational choices and lessons learnt 
from the response. 
 
2. SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 
The operational critical review will mainly focus on the first week of the emergency but will also 
provide an overview to cover the 6 months period from November 2013 to April 2014.  
The review will cover four main areas: 
The initial phase of the emergency response: 
 Anticipation of the emergency and pre-positioning of OCs.  
 Choices made by each OC, pre-assessments: geography, initial intentions in responding, etc.  
 How “distribution of tasks” among OCs was decided? 
 Timeliness of the response in view of needs and capacities deployed by other actors 
 When decisions were taken  which decisions? 
 What activities in relation to the needs/other actors 
 Critical obstacles faced in assessing and deploying operations in the first days  
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The second phase, defining mid-term operational choices:  
 Analysis of the situation (need / response) in each affected area  (by OC) 
 How was this analysis formed? 
 How did this analysis impact on the initial operational choices and redirect the operations of 
each OC? 
 What operational strategies where used across the sections? 
 Was there any influence due to fundraising expectations in the development of the presence of 
OCs or choice of operations? 
 What joint operational and support strategies did the OCs develop? 
 What was the basis for the huge operational disparity between OCs and how benefits versus 
inputs decisions were made (“beneficiaries” vs money and HR input)? 
 What is the perception (of main regional actors) of MSF added value in the response with 
respect to the overall situation (vs local civilians and army, other actors, etc.)? Which actors are 
perceived to have made the biggest difference for the populations? 
 
What lessons learnt can we draw? 
 Strategies used in relations to the global results obtained  
 Future MSF role in this kind of disaster: which response, which magnitude, number of OCs 
required, which specific MSF know how to promote (e.g. logistic response, Medical response) 
etc. 
 How shall MSF prepare/organise? /specialise? /coordinate? For the next ones (from floods to 
cyclone)?   
 
Use of regional capacity 
 How far there was a direct added value to regional capacities of MSF 
 Role of these capacities in: 
 preparedness 
 anticipation of the cyclone 
 direct operational response 
 Lessons learnt in the added value of regional capacity 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
The review will be based on: 
 Interviews of key actors in the response (all e-desks & teams, ODs, other actors) 
 Review of key documents (correspondence, action plans, project committees, sitreps …) 
 Global review of medical and operational data (no in-depth analysis of outcomes) 
 Interview of key external national and international actors 
 10 – 14 days visit to the field/region, 
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 Use and be complementary to the Aid System analysis undertaken 
4. TIMEFRAME AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The review will take place during the months from August to October, 2014 
Total duration of the review is 10 weeks, including the field-visit 
The first draft report will be ready to be discussed by the Executive Committee in October, 2014 
Management of the evaluation process by the Vienna evaluation unit (VEU) of MSF 
 
5. JOB PROFILE/S of EVALUATOR/S 
 Two evaluators, one medical, one non-medical 
 Experience in humanitarian response to natural disaster emergencies 
 High level operational experience in managing humanitarian interventions  
 Proven evaluation skills 
 Writing skills 
 Fluency in English 
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5.2 List of interviewees 
 
Name Function 
Dr Theodoro J. Herbosa Under-Secretary of Health, DoH 
Dr Paulyn Jean B. Rosell-Ubial Assistant Secretary of Health, DoH 
Dr Arnel Rivera Health Emergency Management Staff, Response Division, 
DoH 
Alfred S. Romualdez Mayor of Tacloban City 
Dr Jose Llacuna DoH Regional Director, Region 8, Tacloban 
Dr Patricia S. Trabado  Provincial Health Officer, Iloilo 
Dr Marian Epefania Isiderio  Provincial Health Officer, Eastern Samar 
Dr Aileen Riel-Espina Chief Medical Professional staff, Eastern Visayas Regional 
Medical Center 
Dr Nevio Zagaria Team Leader, Emergency and Humanitarian Action 
World Health Organization, Regional Office for the 
Western Pacific, Manila 
Dr Roderico Ofrin WHO Health Cluster Coordinator for Typhoon Yolanda, 
EHA Team Leader WHO Regional Office of Southeast Asia 
David Carden Head of UNOCHA, Philippines 
Jasper Engbory UNOCHA Coordinator, Leyte province 
Paulina Lawson EVNET Director 
Alain Grall OCP Supply manager 
Alexis Moens OCB Log Emergency  
Agnes Sobry OCB medical coordinator 
André Sardo  OCB manager of hospital project in Brussels 
Anne Taylor OCP Deputy emergency desk in Tokyo 
Bart Janssens OCB Director of operations 
Caroline Séguin OCP Emergency coordinator 
Dounia Dekhili OCP Emergency desk 
Eric Pujo OCP Emergency Logistic 
Florent Uzzeni Deputy OCG Emergency desk 
Hugues Robert OCG Emergency desk 
 Ibrahim Younis OCA Emergency Coordinator 
Irene Schiess OCBA Log referent of the Emergency Unit 
Jean Plaetinckx  OCB Emergency coordinator 
Jean-Yves Nuttinck OCB Water and sanitation emergency team 
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Jean-Sébastien Matte OCG Emergency coordinator 
Jeff Fesselet OCA Logistic Coordinator 
Jeremie Bodin MSF Japan General Director 
Jerome Michon OCG Logistician 
Johann Von Schrieb OCB Emergency response team 
Laurence de Barros OCB Head of mission 
Llanos Ortiz OCBA Emergency desk 
Maria Guevara Regional Humanitarian Position (HART) 
Marie-Christine Férir OCB Emergency Unit 
Marie-Noelle Rodrigue OCP Director of Operations 
Martine Flokstra OCA Emergency Coordinator 
Natasha Reyes Hong Kong Emergency response manager 
Olimpia de La Rosa  OCBA: Medical referent in emergency desk 
Paul McPhun MSF Australia General Director 
Pete Buth OCA Deputy Director of Operations 
Raquel Ayorra OCBA Director of Operations 
Rémi Carrier Hong Kong General Director 
Thierry Boucher OCB Log/Supply referent Emergency Unit 
William Vannier OCB Supply manager 
Vince Hoedt OCA Emergency Desk 
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5.3 Tables and sample questionnaires 
Medical activities per OC (including vaccination campaign and mental health activities) 
 OCA OCBA OCB OCG OCP Total 
Medical activities        
OPD       
Total OPD consultations during intervention  5263 22926 10021 9385 14277 65162 
Total patients seen in emergency room   1815   1468 3283 
Follow up consultations     1719 1719 
Dressings 473 1584 2503 436 2346 7342 
Tetanus vaccinations delivered as part of wound care 316 1242   1155 2713 
Total of facilitated emergency referrals 37 30 11 61 13 152 
IPD       
Total number of admissions  357 369  273 999 
OT activity  45 27  266 338 
Caesarean Sections  1 9  24 34 
Minor     64 64 
Wound   12  138 150 
Other  43 6  40 79 
Maternity activity       
Number of admissions   129  220 349 
Number of delivery   92 108  160 360 
Number of ANC consultations     530 530 
Number of PNC     62 62 
Number of tetanus vaccinations     116 116 
Neonatal       
Admission     42 42 
Mental health       
Group sessions 54 74 56 167 132 345 
Total number of participants in group discussions 1947 769  1277 2515 7820 
Individual consultations 397 39 80 344 404 1298 
Psycho-educational sessions 168 117  151  281 
Total number of participants in psycho-educational sessions  7396 9406  1653  13592 
Vaccination campaign       
Measles (6 months-15 years) nr of children    14999  14999 
Polio (0-5 years)    4654  4654 
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Water and sanitation/food and NFI distribution activities per OC 
 OCA OCBA OCB OCG OCP Total 
Watsan water trucking and bucket chlorination             
Target population water trucking/ bucket 
chlorination (at maximum activities) 
32967 8165 23345     41132 
Total amount of treated water provided m3 3710 993 4103     4703 
Nr litres safe drinking water per person per day 
(average) 
3,2 9,1        
Aquatab and chlorine donation             
Target population Aquatab/chlorine donation 28200 2996       31196 
Aquatab/chlorine donation in m3 of potable water 
supply 
35071     12000   47071 
Well cleaning     62 37   99 
NFI distribution              
Distributed hygiene kits  1093 12115 2896 452 3000 19556 
Distributed NFI kits  2009 3819 3238 10256 3000 22322 
Distributed jerry cans   14811 1215 960 6000 22986 
Distributed blankets   6874 3760 1604 21850 34088 
Distributed tents   3846 2956 1529 1500 9831 
Distributed tarpaulins   9855 2280 1874   14009 
Distributed reconstruction kit 4820 1250 2000     8070 
              
Food distribution (households)       9892   9892 
 
Interview questions to Directors of Operations 
Anticipation / Preparedness 
A. Was there a pre-decision to intervene when the Typhoon alert was made? 
a. Was there a budget/envelope identified? 
B. Was there any discussions between the Dirop regarding who or how MSF might respond? 
Situation Analysis 
A. Did the situation analysis/assessments impact on the initial operational choices? 
a. Activities added/stopped/updated 
Operational Choices and strategies 
A. What factors influenced your ops strategy:  
1. Finance 
2. FR 
3. HR 
4. Media 
5. MSF pressure 
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6. Other ops choices/needs 
Retrospective- what influenced/impacted at the time and looking back what was the impact positive or negative? 
B. How proportionate do you think the response was? Vis a Vis other emergencies at the time? 
C. Disparity between the operational responses 
1. What is your perception of the reason for this? 
D. How timely do you think your OC response was? 
1. Where there delays in responding? 
2. If yes, what were the reasons? 
E. How do you perceive the role of the regional offices (Japan, Australia/Hong Kong) in the different stages of the 
emergency?  
1. Was there a benefit for your section from the regional presence/knowledge/response? 
Perception/MSF added value 
A. What do you think in retrospect of the global MSF intervention? 
B. What could have been done better/differently? Globally and by MSF. Was there any responses that were missing? 
a. Are there any lessons that can be learnt from this intervention? 
b. In retrospect what were the advantages or disadvantages for all 5 sections to be present? 
c. Was there a need for all 5 sections to be present? 
 
Interview questions emergency desk  
Anticipation / Preparedness 
A. Did your OC have an E-prep plan in place for the Philippines prior to the emergency: for example. 
a. Pre-positioned stocks 
b. Operational strategies 
B. What contact did MSF have in the country and what knowledge was available on the context?  
C. What information was available to you, before Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines? 
a. Alerts 
b. Expected impact (UN/Gov etc.) 
c. Each OCs plan and how was this discussed with each section? 
 What mechanisms worked/did not work 
D. Was there a pre-decision for your OC to intervene when the Typhoon alert was made? 
a. Was there a budget/envelope identified? 
E. How was the decision to respond made? 
a. With other OCs? 
Situation Analysis 
A. How did the analysis impact on the initial operational choices 
a. Activities added/stopped/updated 
B. What factors influenced your decisions on the type and proportionality of your OC response from the situation 
analysis? 
C. What were the critical obstacles to responding? 
D. What was the role of the regional offices and their e-desks? 
a. Did your response utilise the capacity and/or resources from the regional offices? 
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Operational Choices and strategies 
F. What was the Ops Strategy of your OC? 
1. Type of activities 
2. Location/s 
3. Use of existing/separate structures 
4. Time horizon (specific- short-medium) 
G. What other factors (if any) influenced your operational strategy: such as; 
7. Finance 
8. FR 
9. HR 
10. Media 
11. MSF pressure 
12. Other ops choices/needs 
Retrospective- what influenced/impacted at the time and looking back was the impact positive or negative? 
H. How proportionate do you think the response was? Vis a Vis other emergencies at the time? 
I. “Disparity between the operational responses” stated in the ToR 
1. What is your perception of the reason for this? 
J. How timely was the response of your OC? 
1. Where there delays? 
2. What were the reasons? 
3. In relation to other actors? 
K. What was the role of the regional offices/e-desks in the implementation? 
Coordination 
L. What joint operational and support strategies did the OC’s develop? 
M. What was the role of the regional offices/e-desks? 
Perception/MSF added value 
N. What do you think in retrospect of the global MSF intervention? 
a. In relation to the response by other actors including civilian, army, authorities and other organisations? 
b. Which actors are perceived to have made the biggest difference for the populations? 
O. What could have been done better/differently by MSF? Was there any responses that were missing? 
a. Are there any lessons that can be learnt from this intervention? 
b. In retrospect what were the advantages or disadvantages for all 5 sections to be present? 
c. Was there a need for all 5 sections to be present? 
P. What was the most important contribution of MSF? 
 
Interview questions to emergency response teams  
Situation Analysis 
A. How did the analysis impact on the initial operational choices 
a. Activities added/stopped/updated 
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B. What factors influenced your decisions on the type and proportionality of your OC response from the situation 
analysis? 
C. What were the critical obstacles to responding? 
D. What was the role of the regional offices and their e-desks? 
a. Did your response utilise the capacity and/or resources from the regional offices? 
Operational Choices and strategies 
A. What was the Ops Strategy of your OC? 
1. Type of activities 
2. Location/s 
3. Use of existing/separate structures 
4. Time horizon (specific- short-medium) 
B. What other factors (if any) influenced your operational strategy: such as; 
1. Finance 
2. FR 
3. HR 
4. Media 
5. MSF pressure 
6. Other ops choices/needs 
Retrospective- what influenced/impacted at the time and looking back was the impact positive or negative? 
A. How proportionate do you think the response was? Vis a Vis other emergencies at the time? 
B. “Disparity between the operational responses” stated in the ToR 
1. What is your perception of the reason for this? 
C. How timely was the response of your OC? 
1. Where there delays? 
2. What were the reasons? 
3. In relation to other actors? 
D. What was the role of the regional offices/e-desks in the implementation? 
Coordination 
A. What joint operational and support strategies did the OC’s develop? 
B. What was the role of the regional offices/e-desks? 
Perception/MSF added value 
A. What do you think in retrospect of the global MSF intervention? 
a. In relation to the response by other actors including civilian, army, authorities and other organisations? 
b. Which actors are perceived to have made the biggest difference for the populations? 
B. What could have been done better/differently? Globally and by MSF. Was there any responses that were missing? 
a. Are there any lessons that can be learnt from this intervention? 
b. In retrospect what were the advantages or disadvantages for all 5 sections to be present? 
c. Was there a need for all 5 sections to be present? 
C. What was the most important contribution of MSF? 
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Interview questions to external actors  
Perception/MSF added value 
Reason for MSF evaluation 
A. What in your opinion where the most important needs in the first month of the emergency? 
B. Which actors played the most important roles in the response outside of the government? 
C. What do you think in retrospect of the MSF intervention? 
D. What could have been done better/differently? Globally and by MSF?  
E. Was there anything missing in the response? 
F. What do you think was the most important contribution of MSF? 
G. Which actors are perceived to have made the biggest difference for the populations? 
H. How timely was the MSF response? 
 
Interview questions to regional office representatives  
Anticipation / Preparedness 
A. Did your office have an E-prep plan in place for the Philippines prior to the emergency: for example. 
B. What contact did MSF have in the country and what knowledge was available on the context?  
C. What information was available to you, before Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines? 
a) Alerts 
b) Expected impact (UN/Gov etc.) 
c) Each OCs plan and how was this discussed with each section? 
 What mechanisms worked/did not work 
D. How was your office involved in the response of the different OCs? 
Situation Analysis 
A. What was your role in providing context analysis for MSF? 
B. What were the critical obstacles to responding? 
Operational Choices and strategies 
A. What was the role of the regional offices and their e-desks? 
a. Did the response utilise the capacity and/or resources from the regional offices? 
Retrospective- what influenced/impacted at the time and looking back was the impact positive or negative? 
A. How proportionate do you think the response was Vis a Vis regional capacity including other actors? 
B. “Disparity between the operational responses” stated in the ToR 
1. What is your perception of the reason for this? 
C. How timely was the response? 
1. Where there delays? 
2. What were the reasons? 
3. In relation to other actors? 
Coordination 
A. What joint operational and support strategies did the OC’s develop? 
B. What was the role of the regional offices/e-desks? 
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Perception/MSF added value 
A. What do you think in retrospect of the global MSF intervention? 
a. In relation to the response by other actors including civilian, army, authorities and other organisations? 
B. What could have been done better/differently by MSF? Was there any responses that were missing? 
a. Are there any lessons that can be learnt from this intervention? 
b. In retrospect what were the advantages or disadvantages for all 5 sections to be present? 
c. Was there a need for all 5 sections to be present? 
C. What was the most important contribution of MSF? 
 
 
 
 
